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Location decisions and the liability of foreignness: Spillover effects between factor mar-
ket and capital market strategies 
 
In this paper we build on the liability of foreignness concept and the institutional perspective 
to show how an equity listing and subsidiary formations in the host market are interlinked. 
Using a matched sample of foreign equity-listed and domestic equity-listed European firms on 
EU-regulated capital markets, we find that (1) the number of prior host-market subsidiary 
formations increases the probability of a host-market equity listing, and (2) a prior host-
market equity listing increases the number of host-market subsidiary formations. Hence, we 
identify spillover effects between factor market and capital market strategies. However, the 
extent of these spillover effects depends on institutional characteristics of the host market, 
where companies on smaller markets gain higher spillover effects. We contribute to interna-
tional management and finance research by providing factor market strategies as a valuable 
source to overcome capital market liabilities of foreignness and capital market strategies as a 
valuable source to overcome factor market liabilities of foreignness. 
 





Although internationalization into foreign factor markets and capital markets may entail im-
portant benefits for companies (Buckley, P.J. und Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1988; Karolyi, 
2006; Pagano et al., 2002), such expansion may be accompanied by competitive disad-
vantages relative to local companies (Denk et al., 2012; Zaheer, 1995). When entering a par-
ticular host market, foreign companies typically suffer from additional tacit and social costs of 
doing business abroad (Bell et al., 2012; Eden und Miller, 2004; Hymer, 1976), referred to as 
the liability of foreignness (LOF). Hence, being foreign often comes with a competitive dis-
advantage in terms of unfamiliarity, relational and discrimination hazards compared to do-
mestic firms (Denk et al., 2012; Zaheer, 1995). Literature provides evidence that the LOF 
concept is relevant in both factor markets and capital markets (Bell et al., 2012), differentiat-
ing a factor market liability of foreignness (FMLOF) and a capital market liability of foreign-
ness (CMLOF). 
Research on multinational enterprises' (MNEs) foreign location strategy has identified a num-
ber of mechanisms to overcome the FMLOF and CMLOF (Jiang et al., 2014; Zaheer, 1995). 
A central finding of this literature is the importance of prior experience and market 
knowledge to mitigate the degree of FMLOF (Peterson und Pedersen, 2002). However, also 
host-market experience of top management teams and fruitful network ties within the host-
market business environment are understood to be an effective means to overcome FMLOF 
(Asmussen, 2009; Blass und Yafeh, 2001). Just recently, scholars have started to transfer the 
LOF approach to the field of international finance and capital markets research (Bell et al., 
2012), including mechanisms for overcoming CMLOF. Bell et al. (2012) focus on the “legit-
imacy deficit” of foreign equity-listed companies and suggest bonding, signaling, organiza-
tional isomorphism, and endorsements by reputable third parties to reduce the CMLOF. How-
ever, these studies focused either solely on factor markets or capital markets, whereas poten-
tial spillover effects between factor market and capital market location decisions have been 
neglected so far. The few existing studies combining factor market activities and capital mar-
ket activities disregard the bilateral context of the LOF and focused on foreign market expan-
sion as a whole (e.g. Pagano et al., 2002; Saudagaran, 1988). 
Therefore, we integrate strategies to overcome FMLOF and CMLOF with the idea that factor 
market and capital market decisions are interlinked. To explain the spillover effects between 
factor market and capital market strategies, we argue in line with prior LOF literature that the 
extent of LOF depends on experience and visibility in the host market. The relevance of prior 
experience and market knowledge as a means to overcome or mitigate the degree of LOF has 
long been discussed in the literature (Davidson, 1980; Peterson und Pedersen, 2002), as 
knowledge and experience reduce the risks of unfamiliarity hazards and relational hazards. 
Furthermore, a foreign firm's visibility relates to the degree to which stakeholders in a particu-
lar location, including investors, consumer, suppliers, competitors or the general public, are 
able to observe a firm's activities in the host market (Puck et al., 2013). This visibility of a 
firm's activities to local stakeholders will influence the LOF, because it reduces the risks of 
relational hazards and discriminatory hazards. Applying these lines of reasoning to the idea 
that factor markets and capital markets are interlinked, we argue that prior factor market strat-
egies increase experience in and knowledge about a host market’s legal systems as well as 
increase a foreign firm’s visibility among local investors, consequently reducing CMLOF. 
The other way round, capital market strategies may increase experience, knowledge and visi-
bility within the host factor market and consequently reduce FMLOF. Thus, we argue that 
host-market internationalization strategies, being factor market or capital market strategies, 
help to overcome the FMLOF and CMLOF. We examine the spillover effects between factor 
market and capital market strategies, by linking host-market equity listings, defined as initial 
public offerings (IPOs) or secondary public offerings in the host country, to the number of 
subsidiaries in the host country. The spillover effect is supposed to work in both directions, 
where (1) MNEs benefit from prior host-market subsidiary formations when listing on the 
respective capital market, and (2) MNEs benefit from a prior host-market equity listing when 
founding subsidiaries in the respective factor market. Furthermore, research on the role of 
institutional context suggests that the success of specific strategies that firms employ to miti-
gate LOF costs may be a function of the relevant institutional characteristics of the host mar-
ket (Bell et al., 2012). Host-market size is an important institutional characteristic in this case, 
as market size on the one hand influences the complexity of learning about the market: the 
larger the market, the harder it will be for a firm to completely understand and learn its rules. 
On the other side, market size has an effect on the visibility of foreign firms: the smaller the 
market, the easier it is for firms to become visible players in a foreign environment. There-
fore, we rely on the institutional perspective to provide the host-market size as an important 
boundary condition to the spillover effects between factor market and capital market location 
decisions.  
By following the claim of Bell et al. (2012) to investigate the interactions between FMLOF 
and CMLOF, our study makes the following important interdisciplinary contributions to theo-
ry in the fields of finance and international management. First, we contribute to finance and 
international management literature that links factor market to capital market strategies (e.g. 
Pagano et al., 2002; Saudagaran, 1988). Showing that capital market and factor market loca-
tion decisions are interlinked, we extend the existing literature by focusing on host-market 
spillover effects. Specifically, we add prior experience, market knowledge and visibility in the 
host factor market as valuable sources to overcome or limit the degree of CMLOF and vice 
versa. Thus, we add to prior research on factors to overcome unfamiliarity, relational and dis-
crimination hazards and consequently the LOF. Second, showing that prior subsidiary for-
mations increase the probability of a host-market equity listing, we are among the first to pro-
vide strategies to overcome or limit CMLOF. In that respect, we also contribute to finance 
literature explaining the foreign equity listing location decision of companies (e.g. Karolyi, 
2006; Pagano et al., 2002). Third, we show that a prior host-market equity listing increases the 
number of host-market subsidiary formations. We extend international management literature 
on strategies to overcome or limit FMLOF, by adding capital market strategies as an addition-
al mechanism. Fourth, by applying an institutional perspective and providing host-market size 
as a conditional determinant on the spillover effects between factor market and capital market 
location decisions, we find that institutional characteristics, together with firm-specific char-
acteristics, matter for overcoming LOF. Thus, the institutional perspective ties in with the 
LOF concept by providing an important boundary condition to the spillover effects between 
factor market location strategies and capital market location strategies. 
We conduct an empirical analysis with publicly available data of European companies incor-
porated in and listed on the 13 largest stock markets within the European Union (EU). Alt-
hough the exclusive use of relatively developed countries within the EU may reduce the insti-
tutional differences among countries, we argue that the resulting conservatism paired with the 
common regulation, ensuring consistent accounting and publication rules to provide compara-
bility and availability of company data, outweigh the disadvantages of the sample country 
selection. Based on our sample countries, we use propensity scores to match foreign equity-
listed with domestic equity-listed companies from the same country of incorporation and sub-
sequently run regression analyses explaining the relationship between host-market equity list-
ings and host-market subsidiary formations. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, we introduce the main theory and develop our 
hypotheses. Next, we provide a description of the data and methodology, followed by the em-
pirical results. Finally, we discuss our results and provide possible implications and limita-
tions for further research. 
 
2 Theory and hypotheses 
2.1 Theoretical background 
International management research provided a number of explanations for international pro-
duction and foreign direct investments (e.g. Buckley, P.J. und Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1988), 
where location advantages explain why foreign firms choose to supply their markets from a 
foreign base, rather than from a domestic base (Dunning, 2000). However, research on inter-
nationalization strategies and market entry barriers has confirmed that foreign subsidiaries 
typically suffer from the LOF (Hymer, 1976; Lu und Beamish, 2001; Miller und Richards, 
2002). LOF is defined as all additional costs a foreign firm incurs that a local firm would not 
incur. Hence, being foreign often comes with disadvantages in terms of costs and information 
deficiencies compared to domestic firms (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). The decision to enter 
a foreign market consequently rests upon a systematic analysis of the benefits of international-
ization and the LOF (Hymer, 1976; Rugman und Verbeke, 2004).  
The LOF may arise from unfamiliarity hazards, relational hazards, and discrimination hazards 
(Denk et al., 2012). Unfamiliarity hazards are incurred through incorrect market assessment, 
insufficient and erroneous information, and inadequate knowledge of the host country's cul-
ture, norms, values, and business practices (Caves, 1971; Eden und Miller, 2004; Peterson 
und Pedersen, 2002). Relational hazards arise because of higher internal organizational costs, 
where interactions within the company, such as the management of employees abroad, be-
come more demanding (Eden und Miller, 2004). Moreover, relational hazards occur in exter-
nal interactions within the buyer-supplier-competitor network because of a lack of embed-
dedness in local networks and a lack of trust (Eden und Miller, 2004). Finally, costs from dis-
crimination hazards arise when the foreign company is treated in an unfavorable way by local 
stakeholders or by the home government (Denk et al., 2012). Among other possibilities, these 
costs might reflect consumer ethnocentricity in the host country (Balabanis et al., 2001) or 
political hazards (Henisz und Williamson, 1999). While initial studies have focused on the 
competitive disadvantage for MNE subunits (Zaheer, 1995), Bell et al. (2012) expanded the 
LOF research beyond the factor market domain and identify liabilities faced by firms seeking 
resources in foreign capital markets. Foreign equity-listed companies tend to be at a disad-
vantage compared to domestic equity-listed companies, since they experience difficulties in 
making themselves known to local investors (Bruner et al., 2004), display insufficient rela-
tional ties (Ghoshal und Bartlett, 1990) and suffer from investors' home bias (French und Po-
terba, 1991), raising the costs of capital of foreign companies and consequently cause high 
market-entry barriers. 
From the existing findings, we derive two mechanisms that help firms to overcome LOF. A 
central finding in the literature is the importance of prior experience and market knowledge to 
overcome or mitigate the degree of LOF by reducing the unfamiliarity hazards as well as the 
relational hazards (Davidson, 1980; Peterson und Pedersen, 2002). MNEs will gradually ac-
quire knowledge about a foreign country's market dynamics and culture as its market experi-
ence in the host country increases (Chang, 1995). Accumulated knowledge about a country's 
institutional environment also adds to a firm's ability to manage policy uncertainty (Delios 
und Henisz, 2003), thereby again reducing unfamiliarity and relational hazards. Moreover, 
visibility affects the number of actors in the overall business environment that are aware of 
the firm (Puck et al., 2013). As a result, firms that are visible to the relevant set of actors will 
be better recognized, thereby reducing the risk of both relational and discrimination hazards. 
Very visible firms are also better known, making the development of new ties to local stake-
holders less costly. Furthermore, visibility reduces the risk of discrimination in a foreign mar-
ket, as the probability of negative consequences for the discriminating stakeholders increase. 
Therefore, the degree of LOF will also depend on a firm’s visibility to relevant actors in the 
host environment. To derive our hypotheses on the factor-market-to capital-market spillover 
(and vice versa), we consequently base our reasoning on both experience and knowledge as 
well as visibility. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
Investors perceive that the risks and costs of acquiring and holding equities issued by foreign 
firms are sufficiently higher than they are for local securities, they will choose to keep their 
focus on local firms (Bell et al., 2012; Bruner et al., 2004). One source of CMLOF may arise 
from information deficiencies (unfamiliarity hazards), that stem from different disclosure re-
quirements, corporate governance regulations, and corporate cultures (Bell et al., 2012). Man-
aging subsidiaries in the host market is accompanied by experience with and knowledge about 
host market accounting systems, corporate governance rules and local business practices and 
conventions, which are required for investors to meaningfully evaluate foreign financial as-
sets. Thus, prior factor market strategies facilitate the access of information for analysts and 
investors, increasing trading volume and liquidity. Hence, investors prefer firms they are fa-
miliar with, where such familiarity often arises from proximity (Bell et al., 2012). Grinblatt 
und Keloharju (2000) found that investors are more likely to hold, buy, and sell the stocks of 
firms that are located close to the investor, that communicate in the investor's native tongue, 
and have chief executives of the same cultural background. However, the degree of familiarity 
depends on the experience and market knowledge of the firm, where local management and 
employees of the subsidiary are closer to the investor, communicate in the investor's native 
tongue and share the same cultural background.  
Furthermore, investors prefer stocks with easily recognized products, and are less likely to sell 
shares of companies they frequent as customers (Sarkissian und Schill, 2004). Since the char-
acter of local subsidiaries is to enhance visibility and name recognition among the local busi-
ness environment, prior host-market subsidiary formations may increase firms' visibility and 
decrease investors' unfamiliarity costs. Besides information and unfamiliarity costs, one of the 
fundamental problems faced by foreign firms in international capital markets is a lack of legit-
imacy (relational and discrimination hazards), defined as a society's permission for the firm to 
do business (Dowling und Pfeffer, 1975). In the case of firms attempting to acquire resources 
in a host-country capital market, legitimacy would be the perception that the firm is similar to 
other host-country firms in that market (Bell et al., 2012). Specifically, companies that sell 
popular brands abroad may find it easier to place their shares in foreign markets because local 
investors already trust them as consumers (Pagano et al., 2002). Hence, local subsidiary for-
mations push the company to engage within the local buyer-supplier-competitor network and 
enhance the visibility and name recognition in the host market. The increased visibility and 
name recognition influence the lack of embeddedness in local networks and limit the lack of 
legitimacy among local investors. Furthermore, through an increased integration into the local 
factor market, also political hazards, such as a more restrictive listing regulations for foreign 
companies, may be reduced. As a consequence, prior host-market subsidiary formations may 
limit CMLOF through reducing the information, unfamiliarity and legitimacy costs that are 
inherent to foreign equity listings. 
 
H1: The higher the number of a firm's prior host-market subsidiary formations, the higher the 
probability of its host-market equity listing. 
 
Insufficient host market knowledge and a lack of embeddedness are amongst the most im-
portant drivers of FMLOF (Eden und Miller, 2004; Peterson und Pedersen, 2002). Learning 
based on prior experience is acknowledged as an important firm capability to overcome the 
FMLOF (Barkema et al., 1996; Chang, 1995). As a firm repeatedly engages in internationali-
zation activities, its ability to efficiently manage internationalization improves, because the 
firm is able to infer insights from previous outcomes and adjust its actions accordingly (Levitt 
und March, 1988). Thus, prior experience and market knowledge reduce the costs of unfamil-
iarity. Based on these findings, we argue that listing a firm's shares on the host-country capital 
market may also provide important experience with and market knowledge about host institu-
tions and business practices. MNEs already acquire experience and knowledge about the host-
markets legal and regulatory frameworks, such as accounting standards or corporate govern-
ance rules and regulations. Furthermore, the collaboration with local service providers, such 
as underwriters or audit firms, may entail cultural experience and increase the understanding 
of the general business environment. 
Pagano et al. (2002) show that a foreign equity listing can raise consumer demand and im-
prove relationships with suppliers and employees. Thus, being listed on the host capital mar-
ket may enhance a firm's recognition and reputation within the host factor market (Siegel, 
2009). This visibility among local networks, including customers, suppliers, competitors, em-
ployees or potential alliance and acquisition partners may be a potential source to reduce 
FMLOF. Local stakeholders may already know the firm's products, performance and business 
strategies. Moreover, prior visibility in the host capital market allows issuers to gain ac-
ceptance within the host-market environment and overcome relational and discrimination 
hazards that may exist. A host-market equity listing may provide a way to become similar to 
local firms, attracting more attention and obtaining more business opportunities in the host 
market as compared to firms from any third country not listed in that particular market. 
Hence, a host-market equity listing may reduce the lack of unfamiliarity, relational and dis-
crimination hazards and reduce the FMLOF. 
 
H2: Firms with a prior listing in a host equity market establish more host-market subsidiaries 
than their domestically listed peers. 
 
To derive our hypothesis on the moderating effect of market size, we rely on the institutional 
perspective from the field of international business. The institutional perspective is guided by 
the assumption that not only firm or industry characteristics, but also the institutional context 
matters for host-market internationalization strategies (Bell et al., 2014; Meyer et al., 2009; 
Moore et al., 2012). The institutional perspective ties in with the LOF concept, because MNEs 
unfamiliar with the institutional environment in their host country are not able to mimic local 
firms, leading to increased legitimacy hazards (Eden und Miller, 2004; Peterson und Peder-
sen, 2002; Zaheer, 1995). However, institutional characteristics vary from one country to an-
other, where formal rules and informal norms of conducting business differ among countries 
(North, 1990). The differences in institutional characteristics of the host market, therefore, 
determine the degree to which a firm is exposed to LOF and its possibilities to overcome 
LOF. An important institutional characteristic that determines the effect of prior market expe-
rience and visibility may be host market size. While a sizeable market may provide benefits in 
terms of sales and trading volume (Davidson, 1980; Karolyi, 2006), it may also decrease the 
success of specific strategies to overcome or limit the LOF.  
Managing subsidiaries on a sizeable host factor market increases the complexity and amount 
of information MNEs need to acquire to gain familiarity with the host factor market environ-
ment. Because MNEs unfamiliar with the institutional environment in the host country further 
face increased legitimacy hazards among investors, host factor market size may be an im-
portant boundary condition on the success of factor market strategies to overcome or limit 
CMLOF. Hence, prior host factor market experience and knowledge may be a less successful 
source to overcome CMLOF on larger host factor markets than on relatively small host mar-
kets. 
Furthermore, firms that are more in the public eye are more likely to face relational and legit-
imacy benefits than firms the public does not know (Dowling und Pfeffer, 1975). Consequent-
ly, visibility and recognition among investors may not be uniform across countries, and may 
depend on the size of the host market. Because a large factor market reduces the visibility 
prior subsidiary formations attract, the effect of prior factor market strategies to overcome or 
limit CMLOF may be smaller the larger the host factor market. 
 
H3a: The size of the host factor market negatively moderates the relationship between a firm's 
prior host-market subsidiary formations and the probability of a host-market equity listing. 
 
Similarly, the host capital market size is supposed to limit the effect of prior capital market 
strategies on FMLOF. Being listed on a sizeable host capital market may increase the amount 
of information a potential customer, supplier or competitor needs to acquire. Moreover, the 
amount of visibility a foreign firm may attract within the host market, may also depend on the 
size of the host capital market. Thus, the effect of prior capital market strategies to overcome 
or limit FMLOF may decrease with the number of companies listed on a particular exchange. 
As a consequence, prior capital market strategies are less valuable in overcoming FMLOF. 
 
H3b: The size of the host capital market negatively moderates the relationship between a 
firm's prior host-market equity listing and host-market subsidiary formations. 
 
Figure 1 provides an overview of our conceptual model, illustrating the spillover effects be-
tween factor market location strategies and capital market location strategies. 
 
Insert figure 1 near here 
 
3 Method 
3.1 Sample and estimation technique 
We focus our analysis on European companies that are incorporated in and listed on the larg-
est stock markets within the European Union. More specifically, we only consider countries 
which exceed a minimum market capitalization of USD 100 bn per year-end 2012 (see table 
1). These countries and its main stock exchanges are chosen because of the common regula-
tion within the European Union, ensuring consistent accounting and publication rules that 
provide comparability and availability of company data, controlling for a potential reporting 
bias. Furthermore, we consider only EU-regulated markets, since disclosure requirements are 
higher than for exchange-regulated markets, allowing for comparable results between stock 
markets. Moreover, European stock exchanges have been quite successful in securing their 
position amongst the leading global stock markets (Pagano et al., 2002). They remain highly 
attractive for a large number of foreign companies, which are diverse in their industry, size 
and institutional background. On the contrary, a EU-based sample limits the degree of institu-
tional differences and foreign market entry barriers. However, we think that choosing a con-
servative sample that controls for a potential reporting bias is beneficial in comparison to an 
inconsistent global sample.  
 
Insert table 1 near here 
 
The main data source for the empirical analysis is the Orbis (Bureau van Dijk) database, 
where we accessed the necessary subsidiaries data and firm-specific corporate and financial 
data. Additional economic data is sourced by the WorldBank database. Corporate, financial 
and economic data is based on the year-end 2014. In total, 7,484 companies are listed on the 
largest EU-regulated stock markets in each of the sample countries. Firms listed on more than 
two stock exchanges (multiple listings) are also included, leading to a total number of 10,110 
observations. In order to distinguish the number of subsidiaries before and after the IPO of the 
firm, we eliminated 3,572 observations (2,777 companies) with missing IPO-date data. Fur-
thermore, following conventions of previous foreign listing research (e.g. Pagano et al., 2002; 
Saudagaran und Biddle, 1995), we eliminated 1,531 observations (1,173 companies) from the 
financial, insurance, real estate (2-digit NACE Code 64 to 68) and utility industries (2-digit 
NACE Code 32 to 35). This results in 5,007 observations and 3,534 companies, where 1,557 
are foreign equity-listed and 3,450 are domestic equity-listed observations. 
To test for the relationship between host-market listings and host-market subsidiary for-
mations, we compare the subsidiary formations of foreign equity-listed companies with the 
subsidiary formations of domestic equity-listed companies from the same country of incorpo-
ration. Therefore, we create a matched sample of foreign listings and domestic listings from 
the same country of incorporation and assign the same host market to both sets of observa-
tions. To reduce potential sources of non-comparability (Chaplinsky und Ramchand, 2000), 
we further use propensity scores to select the subset of comparison units similar to the treat-
ment units based on a set of observable covariates (Rosenbaum und Rubin, 1983). Larger and 
older firms tend to list abroad, as these companies are able to bear the high fixed-costs that are 
associated with foreign listings (Pagano et al., 2002). Furthermore, the timing of the initial 
listing seems to be crucial for the listing location decision, and firms from certain industries 
may choose to locate on specific stock markets, because of historical links or a follow-the-
leader effect (Pagano et al., 2002). Therefore, we use firm size, firm age, listing period and 
high-tech sector affiliation (see table 2) to determine the nearest domestic equity-listed neigh-
bor (without replacement) of the foreign equity-listed companies. Due to missing data in the 
observable covariates, the number of observations is reduced to 3,795 (2,538 companies), 
where 1,293 observations (963 companies) are foreign equity-listed. Finally, for some foreign 
equity-listed MNEs it was not possible to find a domestic equity-listed peer, where additional 
302 foreign equity-listed observations sample out. After the matching process, the final sam-
ple comprises of 1,936 observations (1,748 companies) with 968 foreign equity-listed and 968 
domestic equity-listed observations. Subsequently, we use a hierarchical probit regression to 
estimate the relationship between ex-ante host-market subsidiary formations and the foreign 
listing dummy and a hierarchical poisson regression to estimate the relation between foreign 
listings and ex-post host-market subsidiary formations. 
 
3.2 Variables and measurement 
We measure ex-ante host-market subsidiary formations through the number of host-market 
subsidiaries founded before the IPO of the sample firm, where domestic equity-listed firms 
having been assigned to their matched treatment observation. Similarly, we measure ex-post 
host-market subsidiary formations through the number of host-market subsidiaries founded 
after the IPO, where domestic equity-listed firms having been assigned to their matched 
treatment observation. We only consider first-level subsidiaries of the sample companies, 
where a subsidiary was defined as a company of which more than 50% are directly or indi-
rectly owned by a parent company. Furthermore, we only considered subsidiaries, where the 
date of incorporation is known, in order to classify the subsidiaries to the ex-ante or ex-post 
host-market subsidiary formations. Finally, we excluded all financial, insurance, real estate 
and utility subsidiaries (2-digit NACE Code 64 to 68 and 32 to 35) in order to focus on non-
financial subsidiaries only. We ended up with a total number of 26,803 first-level subsidiaries 
that are fully owned by the 1,936 sample companies.  
The foreign listing dummy indicates if the company is foreign equity-listed (cross-listed or 
foreign-IPO-listed) or a matched domestic equity-listed peer. The dummy variable is coded 1 
if the country of incorporation is different from the listing country and 0 otherwise. This im-
plies that a multiple-listed company is considered repeatedly, according to the number of host 
markets. In order to explain the effect of host-market size on the relationships between a host-
market listing and host-market subsidiary formations, we use the host factor market size and 
host capital market size. Whereas the host factor market size is measured by the logarithm of 
GDP (in USD bn), the host capital market size is measured by the logarithm of the number of 
listed firms per stock exchange. 
We also include several control variables in the regression analyses (see table 2). While test-
ing for hypothesis 1 and 3a, we add the variables used within the matching process, in order to 
control for the remaining variance. Therefore, we control for firm size, firm age, listing period 
and high-tech sector affiliation. Furthermore, we also control for firm internationalization, 
measured by the percentage of 3rd country subsidiaries to total subsidiaries. To test for hy-
pothesis 2 and 3b, we need an extended set of control variables. Firm size is expected to ex-
plain the ex-post host-market subsidiary formations of companies. Due to fewer structural and 
financial obstacles, larger companies are supposed to gain foothold in the respective host 
market more easily (Pagano et al., 2002; Claessens und Schmukler, 2007). Furthermore, firm 
age is also found to explain the degree of internationality (e.g. Dunning, 2000; Hasan et al., 
2011) and may thus be related to the ex-post host-market subsidiary formations of MNEs. We 
also control for the listing period, as capital market experience may be associated with the 
intention to gain foothold in the host market. We use the high-tech dummy to control for 
R&D intensity and industry (Lane, 1998; Nachum, 2010). Firm internationalization is used to 
control for international product and labor market spillovers (Pagano et al., 2002) and the pri-
or subsidiary formations dummy to control for the influence of prior factor market experience 
in the host market (Davidson, 1980). Institutional distance is used to control for differences in 
the LOF (Zaheer, 1995), and is measured as the absolute difference between two countries' 
average regulative and normative scores by Xu et al. (2004). We also control for different 
behaviors of cross-listed companies vís-a-vís foreign-IPOs and companies cross-listed on 
multiple stock exchanges. The foreign-IPO dummy variable is coded 1 if the country of in-
corporation is different from the country where the company's main exchange is located and 0 
otherwise. The multiple listing dummy variable is coded 1 if the company is listed on more 
than two stock exchanges and 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for individual country effects 
in order to capture institutional and country-specific differences. We measure these variables 
by including home-country dummies and host-country dummies. 
 
Insert table 2 near here 
 
4 Results 
Table 3 and 4 show the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for both sets of regres-
sion measures. We do not find any problematic or surprising cross-correlations. Nevertheless, 
we calculated variance inflation factors (VIF), indicating a lack of multicollinearity. 
 
Insert table 3 and 4 near here 
 To test for hypothesis 1, we use hierarchical probit regressions, where the dependent variable 
is the foreign listing dummy. The results in table 5 support hypothesis 1. They indicate that 
ex-ante host-market subsidiary formations positively and significantly influences the foreign 
listing decision (ß=0.1716, p<0.01). Hence, the number of prior host-market subsidiary for-
mations explains the host-market listing decisions of MNEs. Model 3 shows the results for 
hypothesis 3a, where we postulate that the positive relationship between the number of host-
market subsidiary formations and the probability of a host-market equity listing is higher for 
companies on smaller factor markets. The results support our hypothesis and indicate a nega-
tive and significant interaction effect of ex-ante host market subsidiary formations and host 
factor market size on the foreign listing dummy (ß=-0.4597, p<0.05). The addition signifi-
cantly increases the explained variance (∆R²=0.0022, p<0.05). We follow the suggestion of 
Aiken und West (1991), illustrating the interaction effect in figure 2. 
 
Insert table 5 near here 
 
To test for hypothesis 2, we use hierarchical poisson regression with the dependent variable 
being the number of host-market subsidiaries founded after the IPO, capturing ex-post host-
market subsidiary formations. Model 1 includes only control variables (see table 6). It indi-
cates that the firm size, listing period, firm internationalization, prior subsidiary formations 
and foreign IPO listings positively influence and institutional distance negatively influences 
the ex-post host-market subsidiary formations. Model 2 shows the results for hypothesis 2, 
and provides evidence that a foreign listing is associated with higher ex-post host-market sub-
sidiary formations (ß=0.2651, p<0.05). Hence, the results support our hypothesis that foreign 
equity-listed companies show higher ex-post host-market subsidiary formations than their 
domestic equity-listed peers. Model 3 shows the results for hypothesis 3b, where we postulate 
that the positive relationship between a foreign listing and host-market subsidiary formations 
is higher for companies that are foreign equity-listed on smaller capital markets. The results 
support our hypothesis and indicate a negative and significant interaction effect of the foreign 
listing dummy and host capital market size on ex-post host-market subsidiary formations (ß=-
0.7025, p<0.05). The addition significantly increases the explained variance (∆R²=0.0025, 
p<0.01). The interaction effect is illustrated in figure 2. 
 
Insert table 6 and figure 2 near here 
 
To strengthen our results, we ran a number of robustness checks. First, we drop multiple data 
entries from the same company to control for potential effect of heteroskedasticity in the re-
gression analyses. Furthermore, we control for a potential bias through the types of subsidiar-
ies, by excluding manufacturing and research subsidiaries in the construction of the ex-ante 
host-market subsidiary formations and ex-post host-market subsidiary formations variables. 
To control for a possible bias due to the matching process, we also use different settings cal-
cualating propensity scores. Furthermore, to consider the size of the different subsidiaries, we 
calculate the total value of ex-post (ex-ante) host-market assets as an alternative measure. To 
account for size and growth of the different companies, we use the ex-post (ex-ante) host-
market subsidiaries ratio, calculated as the number of ex-post (ex-ante) host-market subsidiar-
ies as a proportion of the total number of subsidiaries. We also run regressions by including 
further, removing existing and changing control variables. In particular, we add return on as-
sets to control for firm performance. Furthermore, we include the 2-digit industry dummies, 
and exclude the home-country dummies and the host-country dummies in order to avoid cor-
relations with other independent variables in the poisson regression. However, basic results 
stay similar after the implementation of the above robustness checks. 
 
5 Discussion, implications and limitations 
That MNEs have to combat LOF when crossing national borders to pursue business is widely 
acknowledged (Eden und Miller, 2004; Zaheer, 1995). As a consequence, the identification of 
mechanisms to overcome or limit the FMLOF and CMLOF is important to MNEs and inter-
national management and finance research. Based on the idea that factor market and capital 
market strategies are interlinked (e.g. Pagano et al., 2002; Saudagaran, 1988), we add prior 
factor market location strategies as a means to overcome or limit the CMLOF, and prior capi-
tal market location strategies as a means to overcome or limit the FMLOF. Specifically, we 
show that the number of prior subsidiaries in the host country increases the probability of a 
host-market equity listing. However, the effect depends on the size of the host factor market, 
where smaller markets show a higher spillover effect. Furthermore, a prior host-market equity 
listing increases the number of subsidiaries in the host country, where the benefit is higher if 
the host capital market is rather small. Hence, we find that host-market size negatively mod-
erates both spillover effects between equity listings and subsidiary formations in the host 
country. 
Apart from the empirical and practical contributions we make for MNEs, our results provide 
important contributions to theory development in the field of international management and 
finance. Answering the calls of Bell et al. (2012), we examine the interactions between 
FMLOF and CMLOF, by combining prior work from the field of finance with theory and 
conceptual work central to the field of international management. Specifically, we extend the 
existing literature that relates factor market to capital market decisions (e.g. Pagano et al., 
2002; Saudagaran, 1988), by showing that factor market and capital market location decisions 
are interlinked. Hence, we combine the idea that factor market and capital market strategies 
are interlinked with the LOF concept of international management. 
Second, we contribute to capital market location choice literature in the field of finance (Ka-
rolyi, 2006; Pagano et al., 2002), where a growing body of research suggests that there are 
information spillovers from factor markets to capital markets (Bell et al., 2012). For example, 
Frieder und Subrahmanyam (2005) show that individual investors prefer to invest in stock 
with easily recognized products, and are less likely to sell shares of companies they frequent 
as customers. However, the interaction between factor and capital markets has been demon-
strated in the international context as well, where firms choose to raise capital in countries 
that know their products (Sarkissian und Schill, 2004). Our results are closely related to that 
stream of literature and provide evidence that spillovers from factor markets to capital mar-
kets in a particular host country influence capital market location decisions. As an implication 
for future research we thus believe that the field of finance can benefit from integrating 
CMLOF to further aspects of financing decisions across borders. 
Third, we also make an important contribution to factor market location choice research (e.g. 
Buckley, P.J. und Casson, 1976; Davidson, 1980; Dunning, 1988), identifying factors that 
overcome or limit FMLOF. A central finding within this literature stream is the importance of 
prior experience and market knowledge to overcome or mitigate the degree of FMLOF (Da-
vidson, 1980; Peterson und Pedersen, 2002). Also international experience of top manage-
ment teams, international scope of operations, industry, and fruitful network ties within the 
host-market business environment are understood to be effective means to overcome FMLOF 
(Asmussen, 2009; Blass und Yafeh, 2001). However, while prior literature so far focuses on 
factor market capabilities to overcome FMLOF, our results provide evidence that capital mar-
ket strategies may also be a way to overcome or limit FMLOF. This finding is also related to 
prior finance research arguing that a cross-listing can strengthen the competitive position of a 
firm in its industry and increase its foreign sales by enhancing the firm's brand recognition, 
and reputations with suppliers, employees, and customers (Pagano et al., 2002). Hence, the 
motives for issuing equity abroad may not be purely financial, where a foreign equity listing 
may also serve as a strategic tool to increase name recognition and legitimacy in the host fac-
tor market. Future case-based studies might be an interesting way for future research to shed 
further light on the underlying mechanisms. Doing so might help to better understand the de-
cision processes in firms that lead to such sequential entries. 
Fourth, recent research on the role of institutional context suggests that the success of specific 
strategies that firms employ to mitigate the LOF may be contingent on the institutional char-
acteristics of the host market (Bell et al., 2012). By showing that the spillover effects between 
factor market and capital market strategies are more pronounced on smaller markets, our re-
sults point strongly towards the significance of country-level institutional factors for the like-
lihood of success of specific strategies to overcome LOF. We argue that this is the case for 
two reasons: first, sufficient market knowledge is easier to accumulate in smaller markets. 
This reduces the risk of familiarity hazards and relational hazards for the foreign firm. Sec-
ond, foreign visibility in a host market decreases with increasing market size. Visibility, how-
ever, reduces the risk of relational hazards as well as discriminatory hazards. Therefore, we 
believe that research on location decisions and the LOF can benefit from investigating the 
conditional impact of institutional characteristics of the host country. Host market size may 
only be one possible institutional characteristic that influences the effect of factors to over-
come LOF. Future studies may also integrate different formal and informal characteristics of 
the host country institutional environment. 
Our analysis has a variety of limitations which may lead to some caution in our conclusions 
and also to avenues for future research. Although we are able to separate host-market subsidi-
ary formations before and after the IPO, the lack of more precise historical subsidiaries' data 
limits our empirical study. We only consider subsidiaries that are owned by the listed parent 
company by year-end 2014. As a consequence, subsidiaries that have been sold before year-
end 2014 are not included. Furthermore, we are only able to separate host-market subsidiary 
formations with the help of the IPO date, which may not be equal to the cross-listing date of 
the firm. Furthermore, different types of subsidiaries may potentially lead to different results. 
The focus of this study is on European companies only, where foreign equity-listed firms are 
primarily listed on the London Stock Exchange and the Boerse Frankfurt. While we believe 
that the diverse set of different companies in the sample countries provides important insights 
to the academic discourse, a European-based sample naturally impacts the generalizability of 
the results. Especially, the focus on developed countries and the concentration of foreign list-
ings on the London Stock Exchange and the Deutsche Boerse limits data variation. Although 
we think that the selection of our sample countries provides several important benefits in 
terms of data quality and provides rather conservative results, our findings have to be inter-
preted carefully, since they may only be valid for a subset of firms. Therefore, further re-
search should expand the scope of analysis by including other relevant stock markets, con-
tributing to a better understanding of the relationship between the choice of the listing loca-
tion and the degree of subsidiary formations in the host country. The degree of host-market 
subsidiary formations may be reflected in attitudinal and organizational variables too. Strate-
gic orientation of management, staffing policy, corporate culture, relationships between head-
quarters and subsidiaries, the existence of joint-ventures and alliances in the host country, 
relations to governments and foreign trade associations or compliance with regional laws, 
regulations and business practices are only some of the vast set of additional possible explana-
tory variables that would allow to better capture a firm's degree of subsidiary formations in 
the host market. Finally, some foreign equity-listed firms show a higher number of host-
market subsidiaries than home-market subsidiaries. As a consequence, we raise doubts about 
the appropriateness of the “foreignness” of firms that are listed on foreign equity markets, but 
actually display an extremely high degree of subsidiary formations in the host market. Future 
research may probe into this issue by looking at the development of host-market subsidiary 
formations and by showing how existing studies may be affected through these companies. 
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